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Abstract 
 
Five studies examined the relationship between talent and team performance. Two survey studies 
found that people believe there is a linear and nearly monotonic relationship between talent and 
performance: participants expected that more talent increases performance and that this 
relationship would never turn negative. However, building off research on status conflicts, we 
predicted that talent facilitates performance…but only up to a point, after which the benefits of 
more talent will decrease and eventually turn negative as intra-team coordination suffers. We 
also predicted that the level of task interdependence would be a key determinant of when more 
talent would be detrimental versus beneficial. Three archival studies revealed that the too-much-
talent effect only emerged when in tasks where team members were interdependent (football and 
basketball) but not independent (baseball). Our basketball analysis established the mediating role 
of team coordination. When teams need to come together, more talent can tear them apart. 
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We're faithful and confident that things are going to come good for us. We've got too much 
ability and talent in the team for it not to…With the talent and ability that the players have got 
here, it's only going to bring the best out of everyone. In time, I'm sure we'll bring success. 
 
- Liverpool FC midfielder, Joe Allen, responding to Liverpool’s poor start (and 
eventual lackluster finish) to the 2012-2013 season in an interview with 
LiverpoolFC.com, Sept. 14, 2012 
 
I have players playing in Ligue 1, others in big clubs playing in the Champions League. The 
more I have, the better it is. 
 
- French national team coach, Didier Deschamps, denying the crux of the poor 
performance was a lack of talent in an interview with www.fifa.com, Sept. 7, 2013 
 
Joe Allen’s and Didier Deschamps’s quotes reflect a widely held belief that top talented 
individuals are the key to the performance of teams, organizations, and even entire societies. 
This faith in the power of higher and higher levels of talent to produce ever-better performance 
drives groups to fiercely compete to attract the most talented individuals. Surveys across 
industries and countries find that organizations identify talent attraction as their top priority 
(Ready & Conger, 2007; Chambers, Foulon, Handfield-Jones, Hanklin, & Michaels, 1998). 
These practices are presumably based on the belief that more talent is better, and that the 
relationship between talent and team performance is linear and monotonic. The current research 
tests the validity of this widely held intuition: does bringing together the most talented 
individuals always produce the best performance? 
We propose that these widespread intuitions about talent and team performance are not 
uniformly robust. Specifically, we argue that more talent often facilitates team performance…but 
only up to a point. Beyond this point, the marginal benefits of more talent will decrease and 
eventually turn negative. That is, at some point there will be too much talent that will impair 
team performance. In the current research, we present evidence for this too-much-talent effect, 
  
4 
establish when more talent will be detrimental versus beneficial, and demonstrate why this 
occurs. 
The Too-Much-Talent Effect 
In formulating our too-much-talent hypothesis, we draw from the hierarchy literature, 
which predicts that teams with too many dominant individuals produce disputes over within-
group authority and status that ultimately undermine performance (Bendersky & Hays, 2012). 
We define teamwork as “people working together to achieve something beyond the capabilities 
of individuals working alone” (Marks, Mathieu & Zaccaro, 2001, p. 356). Status competition 
within teams can lead individuals to focus their attention on jostling for intragroup rank rather 
than on directing their efforts towards coordination and team performance (De Dreu & Weingart, 
2003). Indeed, status competition can lead individuals to actively undermine fellow members’ 
efforts so as to advance their own standing within the group hierarchy (Overbeck, Correll, & 
Park, 2005; Porath, Overbeck, & Pearson, 2008). For example, Groysberg, Polzer, and Elfenbein 
(2011) found that having a high ratio of high-status members can negatively affect the 
performance of financial research teams. Likewise, teams composed exclusively of high-
testosterone individuals experienced reduced performance because group members fought for 
dominance (Ronay, Greenaway, Anicich, and Galinsky, 2012). Similar findings have been 
observed in the domain of poultry science, where too many dominant, high egg-producing 
chickens in a single colony reduce overall egg production as a result of intense conflicts (Muir, 
1996). In the absence of a clearly defined pecking order, energy that would normally be steered 
towards intra-team coordination and performance gets diverted towards jockeying for 
dominance. 
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Although status, dominance, testosterone, and chickens’ egg-laying capacity may 
correlate with talent – i.e., one’s ability to consistently perform a task at very high levels – past 
research does not directly address the question of whether more talent might ironically decrease 
team performance. The goal of the current research was therefore to answer whether, when, and 
why high levels of talent may reduce team performance. 
Task Interdependence and Coordination 
 We propose that a too-much-talent effect will emerge because status conflicts impair 
team coordination, “the process of managing dependencies among activities” (Malone & 
Crowston, 1994, p. 87). One factor that influences whether coordination is necessary for teams to 
perform well is the degree of task interdependence, defined as “the extent to which team 
members cooperate and work interactively to complete tasks” (Stewart & Barrick, 2000, p.137). 
When task interdependence is high, team members must coordinate their behavior to 
successfully complete their task while competing with other teams (Wageman, 2001). However, 
when task interdependence is low, each individual’s talent additively contributes to the team 
outcome (Frank, 1985) and thus less coordination among team members is required.  
Based on prior research it is unclear whether task interdependence moderates the 
relationship between talent and team performance. An additional goal of the current research was 
therefore to examine whether the too-much-talent-effect would only emerge in interdependent 
tasks but not in independent tasks. We predicted that the too-much-talent effect – where more 
talent eventually has a negative effect on team performance – would only occur in contexts 
where task interdependence is pronounced. Conversely, for independent tasks, the relationship 
between talent and team performance will never turn negative and more talent will consistently 
lead to better performance.  
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Overview of Studies 
The current research tests whether, when, and why the relationship between talent and 
team performance turns negative. We conducted five studies, using a combination of survey and 
archival methods. Studies 1a and 1b involved surveys that gauged lay perceptions of the 
relationship between talent and team performance. In Study 2, we examined real-world data from 
National Football (Soccer) teams to test the actual impact of talent on team performance during 
the qualification for the 2010 World Cup in South Africa and the 2014 World Cup in Brazil. 
These archival studies allowed us to establish the point at which more talent has decreasing 
marginal benefits, as well as whether and when more talent becomes too much talent and turns 
negative. To test our proposed intra-team coordination mechanism, Study 3 replicated Study 2’s 
findings in the context of the National Basketball Association (NBA) and explored whether 
decreasing levels of intra-team coordination mediate the relationship between too much talent 
and reduced on-court performance. To test whether the impact of talent on team performance 
would not turn negative in relatively independent tasks, Study 4 examined the role of talent in 
Major League Baseball (MLB). Prior research has articulated that baseball depends far less on 
coordination and task interdependence than basketball (Halevy et al., 2012). Therefore, we 
predicted that the relationship between talent and baseball team performance would not turn 
negative.  
Study 1: Lay beliefs about the Relationship between Top Talent and Performance 
Study 1a  
Method. We examined whether people believe that the relationship between top talent 
and team performance is linear and monotonic. Thirty-seven participants (21 men; age, M=33.92, 
SD=11.75) predicted the success of a firm based on the firm’s percentage of top-talented 
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employees. We determined our sample size in advance. Participants were asked about their 
expectations of the firm’s performance (1=very-poor-performance, 10=very-good-performance) 
at 10%-increment levels of top-talent concentration (i.e. 10%, 20%, up to 100% of the firm’s 
employees were top talent). 
Results. Expectations of firm performance monotonically increased as a function of the 
percent of top-talent employees. Expected firm performance was highest (M=9.76, SD=0.80 out 
of maximum performance of 10) when there was nearly 100% top talent. Importantly, people 
believed that the effect of talent would never turn negative (see Figure 1).  
Study 1b  
Method. Thirty-seven participants (25 men; age, M=32.49, SD=10.16) assumed the role 
of a national football (soccer) team manager and selected the combination of players that would 
maximize their team’s chances of winning an international competition. We determined our 
sample size in advance. Two participants failed an attention check and were omitted from the 
analyses. Including them does not affect the significance of the results. Participants selected 11 
players across four different positions: three forwards and midfielders, four defenders, and one 
goalkeeper. Participants had an equal number of top talent and non-top talent players to choose 
from for each position. Top-talent profiles were marked with two gold stars. Participants 
reported on a 7-point scale, “How well do you expect your team to perform in the tournament?” 
Results. On average, 9.74 (SD=1.85) top-talent players were selected for the eleven 
positions (88.57%). Top-talent selections were similar for forwards (90.48%), midfielders 
(86.67%), and defenders (86.43%), but higher for goalkeepers (97.14%), an effect likely due to 
the restricted number of options available for this position. The more top-talent players 
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participants selected, the better they expected their team to perform in the tournament (B=.20, 
SE=.07, p<.01). 
Discussion. Studies 1a and 1b demonstrate that people believe, and reveal in their 
selection decisions the belief that more top talent increases team performance. Importantly, 
participants expected that the effect of talent would never turn negative.  
 
Figure 1. Perceived Relationship between Percentage of Top Talent and Team Performance  
 
 
 
Study 2: Effects of Talent in International Football Contests 
Study 2 investigated whether more top talent could become too much talent and 
undermine actual team performance. Counter to people’s beliefs in a linear and monotonic 
relationship between talent and performance, we predicted that more talent would produce 
marginally diminishing returns that would eventually turn negative. To test this hypothesis, we 
analyzed archival data from the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) on 
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national football team performance. This context allowed us to objectively measure both talent 
and relative team performance.  
Method 
Top talent. Sample size was determined in advance because we measured top talent for 
all national teams that received a FIFA ranking. Top talent was coded by taking the percentage 
of players within each national team that were contracted by one of the world’s elite club teams. 
To assess elite status, we used the Deloitte Football Money League ranking of clubs by revenue 
generated from football activity (Houlihan, Parks, Bull, Hawkins, Hearne, & Schmick, 2010). 
We computed a top talent ratio for each national team roster during the 2010 and 2014 World 
Cup qualification phase by dividing the number of players in each country’s national team active 
in one of these elite clubs (based on the 2008-2010 and 2012-2014 Deloitte club rankings, 
respectively) by the total number of players selected to represent the national team. We included 
only those players who were selected twice or more to represent the national team during the 
qualification phase. Analyses produced similarly significant results with different cut-off points 
(i.e., all selected players, including players selected only once); we chose to include players who 
were selected twice or more to get a more reliable measure of the teams’ regular compositions. 
Higher values indicate a greater ratio of top talent. 
To establish that this is a valid proxy for top talent, we cross-referenced all players 
selected for the FIFA 2010 All-Star team, a composition of “the 2010 World Cup most talented 
players” (http://www.fifa.com). All players selected for the All-Star team were coded as top 
talent in our sample.
1
 
We also conducted robustness tests with different cutoffs of top talent, which replicated 
the results reported here (see Supplementary Online Materials). 
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Team performance. Our team performance data was based on the FIFA rankings during 
the 2010 and 2014 World Cup qualification periods. We chose these periods because both used 
the new FIFA rankings system (www.fifa.com), which calculates the performance of a given 
country’s team in all international matches on the basis of the games’ results, importance of the 
match, strength of opponents, regional strength, period, and the number of matches considered 
per year (see www.FIFA.com for calculation procedure). More points indicate better 
performance.  
The 2008-2010 period included 207 national teams. Papua New Guinea was disqualified 
from participating and was coded as missing. The 2012-2014 period included 209 national teams 
because three new national teams received FIFA affiliation (Curacao, Sao Tome e Principe, and 
South Sudan) whereas the Netherlands Antilles national team was dissolved in October 2010. 
Control variables. To ensure that our findings are robust to other factors that could 
influence team performance, we controlled for roster size measured as the total number of 
players selected and the number of games played during the qualification phase.   
Results 
We used Generalized Estimating Equations with country as the subject variable and 
qualification period as the time variable using a mixed regression method (Tweedie with log 
link) to analyze the data because our dependent variable was based on count data that were 
averaged (Little & Rubin, 1987). Table 1 presents Pearson’s r correlations for all variables. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Variables in Football 
 
 M SD  1. 2. 3. 
1. Team performance 393.30 320.12     
2. Talent .07 .16  .73***   
3. Roster size 18.53 6.79  .53*** .24***  
4. Games played 8.90 4.65  .54*** .29*** .81*** 
    Note.  M  =  Mean, SD  =  Standard Deviation.  
    *** indicates significance at the 99.9% level. 
 
Consistent with the lay intuition documented in Study 1, the linear relationship between 
talent and football team performance was positive and significant (Table 2, Model 1). However, 
Study 2 also revealed a significant quadratic effect of top talent: top talent benefited performance 
only up to a point, after which the marginal benefit of talent decreased and turned negative 
(Table 2, Model 2) (Figure 2). The linear and curvilinear effects were significant when control 
variables were omitted (B=5.95, SE=.42, p < .001 and B=-4.98, SE=.57, p < .001, respectively).  
Table 2. The Impact of Talent on Football Team Performance 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Talent  1.84*** 
(.16) 
4.58*** 
(.11) 
Talent squared  -4.26*** 
(.49) 
Roster size .04*** 
(.01) 
.04*** 
(.01) 
Games played .03*** 
(.01) 
.02** 
(.01) 
Intercept 4.63*** 
(.11) 
4.58*** 
(.11) 
Observations 415 415 
Corrected Quasi Likelihood under 
Independence Model Criterion 
3400.13 2979.62 
   Note.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
   **, *** indicates significance at 99% and 99.9% level, respectively. 
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Figure 2. A too-much-talent effect in football: top talent benefited performance up to a point after which 
the marginal benefit of talent decreased and eventually turned negative (Observed Data)  
 
 
We also examined the impact of outliers using Cook’s distance. The Cook’s distance 
value measures how far an observation is from the others in terms of the levels of the 
independent variable. Observations with values larger than 4/n (with n being the sample size) are 
considered to be potentially highly influential outliers. The linear and curvilinear effect of talent 
remained significant after removing 11 outliers (B=5.61, SE=.43, p<.001 and B=-5.26, SE=.65, 
p<.001). 
Study 3: Talent, Coordination, and Performance in the National Basketball Association 
To examine the robustness of the too-much-talent effect, Study 3 examined the impact of 
top talent on NBA basketball team performance during ten seasons. The availability of 
comprehensive play-by-play data in the NBA also enabled us to test our proposed mechanism 
that lower levels of intra-team coordination would mediate the relationship between too much 
talent and diminished performance.  
Method 
Top talent. We determined our sample size in advance by using NBA team performance 
in the 10 most recent seasons. Because this analysis focused on teams that played in the same 
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league rather than national teams, we coded top talent using the Estimated Wins Added (EWA) 
for all individual players in 30 NBA teams over a period of 10 seasons (2002-2012) available at 
the time of retrieval, totaling 297 team-level observations (there were only 29 teams in the 
seasons of 2002-2004 because the “Charlotte Bobcats” were founded in 2004 and entered their 
first competition in 2004-2005). EWA captures a player’s overall contribution to the team as it 
gives the estimated number of wins a player adds to a team’s season total above what a 
'replacement player' would produce (Hollinger, 2005). To establish that EWA is a valid proxy for 
top talent, we cross-referenced all players selected for the NBA All-Star tournament, which 
brings together “the league’s most talented players” (www.nba.com). Ninety-nine percent of 
players selected for All-Star games during the observed period were coded as top talent in our 
sample. EWA data was retrieved from ESPN (www.espn.com) for each of the 4,292 player-level 
observations.  
For all seasons we coded whether a player was in the top third (33.3%) of the overall 
cohort (1) or not (0) because this cut-off is often used to identify, select, and reward talent in 
organizations (e.g. McClelland, 1998), academia (e.g. Crane, 1965; Auguste, Kihn, & Miller, 
2010) and sports (e.g. Groysberg, Sant, & Abrahams, 2008). Our theory suggests that it is the 
concentration of top talent that matters for coordination and performance. Thus, we did not use a 
team-mean measure because a) it does not accurately reflect the concentration of top talent and 
b) the current measure is conceptually and empirically similar to the measure of top talent that 
we used in Study 2. Robustness tests with cutoffs of 40% and 20% top talent replicated the 
results reported here (see Supplementary Online Materials).   
We calculated the top talent ratio at the team level by dividing the number of players per 
team coded as top talent, by the total number of players per team. To get a more reliable measure 
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of each team’s regular composition, we included only those players who played 20% or more of 
the season’s games. Lower (e.g., 10%) and higher (e.g., 30%) cutoff points produce results with 
the same pattern and level of significance. Higher values indicate higher levels of talent.  
Mediator: Intra-team coordination. We used a three-item measure of on-court 
performance to quantify intra-team coordination. First, we used the average number of assists 
per game; assists are credited when a player passes to a teammate who then scores, indicating 
team members’ ability and willingness to support each other (Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002). 
Second, we used field-goal percentage, which measures the number of field goals made divided 
by the number of field goals attempted. A high field-goal percentage is most likely to result 
when a team is well coordinated because coordinated actions lead to less contested shots. Finally, 
we used the average number of defensive rebounds per game, which occur when a team retrieves 
the ball from the opponent after a missed shot and require coordinated actions (Halevy, Chou, 
Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2012; Wang, 2009). We standardized and averaged these three items (α 
= .63).
2
   
Team performance. Team performance was measured using each team’s end of year 
win percentage and was retrieved from the National Basketball Association (www.nba.com) for 
each of the 10 seasons. Higher values indicate better performance. We obtained identical results 
when using number of wins as the dependent measure.
 
  
Control variables. As in Study 2, we controlled for roster size and number of games 
played. To account for the nonindependence of teams across periods, we also included “lagged 
performance”, which represents win percentage of the preceding season as a control variable. To 
be sure that our process measure captured coordination beyond individual performance, we also 
included individual players’ free-throw percentages (Halevy et al., 2012).  
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Results 
We used fixed-effects linear regressions of panel data with team as the panel variable and 
season as the time variable (Woodridge, 2009). Table 3 presents Pearson’s r correlations among 
all variables.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Variables in Basketball 
 
 M SD  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Team performance .50 .15        
2. Talent .34 .11  .35***      
3. Intra-team Coordination  .00 .75  .63*** .37***     
4. Free-throw percentage .76 .03  .10 .07 .13*    
5. Roster size 13.01 2.37  -.22*** -.34*** -.11 -.10   
6. Games played 80.39 4.82   .00 -.00 .01 .05 -.16**  
7. Lagged performance .50 .15  .55*** .26*** .43*** .05 -.08 .00 
Note.  M  =  Mean, SD  =  Standard Deviation.  
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% level, respectively. 
 
 
Replicating the effects from football, the linear relationship between talent and basketball 
team performance was positive and significant (Table 4, Model 1), but only up to a point, after 
which the marginal benefit of talent decreased and the slope eventually turned negative (Table 4, 
Model 2) (Figure 3). The linear and curvilinear effects remained significant when all control 
variables were omitted (B=1.47, SE=.44, p=.002 and B=-1.45, SE=.61, p=.02, respectively). The 
linear and curvilinear effects also remained significant after excluding 22 outliers (B=1.57, 
SE=.33, p<.001 and B=-1.94, SE=.42, p<.001).  
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Table 4. The Impact of Talent on Basketball Team Performance 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Talent   .35*** 
(.10) 
1.61*** 
(.42) 
.91* 
(.43) 
Talent squared  -1.83** 
(.26) 
-1.23* 
(.57) 
Intra-team Coordination   .10*** 
(.01) 
Free-throw percentage .54 
(.29) 
.56 
(.27) 
.17 
(.24) 
Roster size -.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
-.01* 
(.00) 
Games played -.00 
(.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Lagged performance  .32*** 
(.05) 
.34*** 
(.05) 
.22*** 
(.05) 
Intercept -.12 
(.27) 
-.30 
(.26) 
.28 
(.24) 
Observations 297 297 297 
R-squared .34 .37 .51 
F-statistic 14.11*** 14.93*** 28.84*** 
       Note.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
       *, **, *** indicate significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% level, respectively. 
 
Figure 3. A too-much-talent effect in basketball: Top talent benefited performance up to a point after 
which the marginal benefit of talent decreased and eventually turned negative (Observed Data) 
 
 
 
 We found similar effects of too-much-talent on intra-team coordination. As predicted, 
there was a linear relationship between talent and intra-team coordination (Table 5, Model 1), but 
only up to a point, after which the marginal benefit of talent decreased (Table 5, Model 2) 
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(Figure 4). The linear and curvilinear effects remained significant when all control variables 
were omitted (B=6.74, SE=1.70, p<.001 and B=-5.41, SE=2.30, p=.025, respectively), and also 
after excluding 14 outliers (B=7.89, SE=1.51, p<.001 and B=-7.70, SE=1.88, p<.001).  
 
Table 5. The Impact of Talent on Basketball Intra-team Coordination 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Talent  2.93*** 
(.52) 
7.13*** 
(1.46) 
Talent squared  -6.07** 
(1.90) 
Free-throw percentage 3.89* 
(1.52) 
3.94* 
(1.47) 
Roster size .04 
(.02) 
.03 
(.02) 
Games played .00 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
Lagged performance 1.20*** 
(.26) 
1.25*** 
(.26) 
Intercept -5.32*** 
(1.14) 
-5.91*** 
(1.13) 
Observations 297 297 
R-squared .24 .26 
F-statistic 14.14*** 12.88*** 
      Note.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
      *, **, *** indicate significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% level, respectively. 
 
Figure 4. A too-much-talent effect in basketball: Top talent benefited team coordination up to a point 
after which the marginal benefit of talent decreased and eventually turned negative (Observed Data) 
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Mediation analyses. We tested whether intra-team coordination mediated the effects of 
too-much-talent on performance. Consistent with mediation, the curvilinear effect of top talent 
on performance was much weaker when intra-team coordination was included in the model 
(Table 4, Model 3). A Sobel test revealed a significant mediation of the effect of talent on team 
performance through intra-team coordination (Sobel Z=2.93, p<.01; see Figure 5). We also 
found evidence of mediation when we excluded 22 outliers (Sobel Z=2.17, p<.05). 
Bootstrapping results with 5,000 resamples demonstrated that zero fell outside of the 95% 
confidence interval for the indirect effect (CILow = -1.20; CIHigh = -.12). These analyses 
demonstrate that teams with too high levels of top talent perform worse because they coordinate 
less effectively. 
 
Figure 5. Coordination Mediates Curvilinear Effect of Talent on Basketball Team Performance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Regression coefficients are unstandardized. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% level, respectively. 
 
Study 4: The Moderating Impact of Interdependence in Major League Baseball 
Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that high proportions of top talent reduce team coordination 
and ultimately undermine team performance. Our theory proposes that the too-much-talent effect 
will emerge only when there is a high level of task interdependence among team members. When 
.10 (.01)*** 
-1.83 (.26)** / -1.23 (.57)* 
 
-6.07 (1.90)** 
Team  
Performance  
Intra-Team  
Coordination 
Top Talent 
(Squared Term) 
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task interdependence is low and there is less coordination required, more talent should continue 
to benefit teams and never hurt performance.  
To test this hypothesis, Study 4 analyzed Major League Baseball (MLB) data. Unlike 
football and basketball, Halevy et al. (2012) have demonstrated that baseball involves much less 
task interdependence among team members. In fact, baseball has been described as ‘‘an 
individual sport masquerading as a team sport’’ (Simmons, 2010). Therefore, we predicted that 
the relationship between talent and team performance in baseball would never turn negative.  
Method 
Top talent. We determined our sample size in advance by including all individual 
players in 30 MLB teams over a period of 10 seasons (2002-2012) available at the time of 
retrieval, totaling 300 team-level observations. We coded top talent using the Wins Above 
Replacement (WAR). WAR measures the number of wins a player contributes relative to a freely 
available minor league player. Similar to the top talent measure in Study 3, WAR captures a 
player’s overall contribution to the team and is an ideal measure of talent because it gives the 
estimated number of wins a player adds to a team’s season total above what a 'replacement 
player' would produce. WAR data was retrieved from Baseball Reference (www.baseball-
reference.com) for each of the 7,069 player-level observations. We also conducted robustness 
tests with different cutoffs of 40% and 20% and these analyses replicated the results reported 
here (see Supplementary Online Materials).   
For all seasons we coded whether a player was in the top third (33.3%) of the overall 
cohort (1) or not (0) and calculated the top talent ratio in an identical way as in Studies 2 and 3. 
Like in Study 3, we included only those players who played 20% or more of the season’s games. 
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Lower (e.g., 10%) and higher (e.g., 30%) cutoff points produce identical results. Higher values 
indicate higher levels of talent. 
To be certain that WAR is a valid proxy for top talent, we cross-referenced all players 
selected for the annual MLB All-Star tournament, which brings together “the league’s most 
talented players selected by managers and fans” (www.mlb.com). Of all players that participated 
in All-Star games during the observed period, 80% were coded as top talent.  
Team performance. Team performance was measured using each team’s win percentage 
and was retrieved from Baseball Reference (www.baseball-reference.com) for each of the 10 
seasons. Higher values indicate better performance. We obtained identical results when using 
number of wins as the dependent measure.  
Control variables. We included the same controls as in Study 3.  
Results 
The same analytical approach and regression model was used as in Study 3. Table 6 
presents Pearson’s r correlations among our independent, control, and dependent variables.  
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations between Variables in Baseball 
 
 M SD  1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Team performance .50 .07      
2. Talent .34 .11  .72***    
3. Roster size  23.56 2.54  -.22*** -.37***   
4. Games played  161.95 .31  .10 .14* -.06  
5. Lagged performance .50 .07  .53*** .34*** -.17** .05 
         Note.  M  =  Mean, SD  =  Standard Deviation.  
         *, **, *** indicate significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% level, respectively. 
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As predicted, we found a significant linear relationship between top talent and team 
performance (Table 7, Models 1 and 2) but no curvilinear effect (Figure 6). When all control 
variables were omitted, the linear effect was significant (B=.76, SE=.17, p<.001). Although the 
curvilinear relationship was significant (B=-.49, SE=.24, p=.05), the effect of talent on team 
performance never turned negative. The curvilinear effect was not significant after excluding 17 
outliers (B=.62, SE=.13, p<.001 and B=-.30, SE=.18, p>.10).  
 
Table 7. The Impact of Talent on Baseball Team Performance 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Talent  .41*** 
(.03) 
.70*** 
(.15) 
Talent squared  -.42 
(.21) 
Roster size .00 
(.00) 
.00 
(.00) 
Games played .00 
(.01) 
.00 
(.01) 
Lagged performance .21*** 
(.05) 
.20*** 
(.04) 
Intercept -.33 
(1.68) 
-.38 
(1.71) 
Observations 300 300 
R-squared .60 .61 
F-statistic 78.85*** 93.36*** 
          Note.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
          *, **, *** indicate significance at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% level, respectively. 
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Figure 6. The relationship between top talent and baseball team performance never turned negative 
(Observed Data) 
 
 
 
Consistent with our predictions, the effect of top talent never turned negative in a sport 
where task interdependence is relatively low. There was no too-much-talent effect in baseball 
that we observed in football and basketball. These results suggest that people’s lay beliefs about 
the relationship between talent and performance are accurate, but only for tasks low in 
interdependence.  
General Discussion 
Intuitively people believe that teams will benefit from ever-increasing levels of top talent. 
Indeed, Studies 1a and 1b confirmed that people generally believe that the relationship between 
talent and performance is linear and monotonic; participants expected that more talent increases 
performance and at no point did they expect the relationship between talent and team 
performance to turn negative.  
In contrast to these lay intuitions, Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that the relationship 
between talent and performance eventually turns negative in both football and basketball. First, 
the actual marginal benefit of more talent decreased at a much faster rate than people believed it 
would. Second, in both cases the relationship between talent and performance turned negative 
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above 50% of top-talent levels.  
We predicted that this too-much-talent effect would emerge only when successful 
outcomes are contingent on a high level of task interdependence among teammates. We found 
two pieces of evidence supporting this prediction. First, reduced levels of intra-team coordination 
mediated the too-much-talent effect in basketball. Second, the too-much-talent effect only held 
when task interdependence was high. When interdependence was relatively lower, as in baseball, 
the relationship between top talent and team performance never turned negative. These results 
suggest that people’s lay beliefs about the relationship between talent and performance are 
accurate but only for tasks low in task interdependence.  
The current studies contribute to the literature by identifying both when and why more 
talent becomes too much talent. Although we inferred task interdependence by comparing 
football and basketball with baseball, future research could manipulate task interdependence 
directly and test the effects of other types of interdependence (e.g., outcome interdependence). 
Future research could also more directly explore whether status conflicts underlie our findings, 
as well as investigate whether our findings extend beyond the domain of sports. Based on prior 
research showing that talent affects perceptions of status (Gould, 2002) and that status 
perceptions can hurt performance (Bendersky & Hayes, 2012), we predict that these effects 
should apply to other organizational contexts as well (see Groysberg et al., 2008). Indeed, “what 
connects the domains of sport with other organizational contexts are central concerns of 
competition and cooperation.” (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012, p.399). 
Our findings reflect the disappointing fact that teams of superstars often fail to live up to 
expectations. Consider the disappointing performances of the French national football team in 
the 2010 World Cup, the Dutch national team during the 2012 European Championship, or the 
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Miami Heat before the 2010-2011 NBA season, all of which were brimming with individual 
talent. The current data suggest that selecting fewer top-talented players may produce a better 
team. Indeed, Louis van Gaal made a bold move when he took over as coach of the Dutch 
national team following the 2012 European championship: he completely reassembled the team 
and reduced the percentage of top-talented players from 73% to 43%. His actions suggested that 
he understood the too-much-talent effect that we have documented here. The Dutch qualified for 
the 2014 World Cup without losing a single game. Likewise, the Miami Heat only won the 
championship in 2011-2012 when two of their All-Stars were hobbled by injuries, thereby 
lowering their overall talent but creating a clear pecking order. 
Given the ubiquity of and reliance on interdependent teams in society, organizational 
architects should be wary that too much top talent can produce diminishing marginal returns and 
even decrease performance by hindering intra-team coordination. Just as a colony of high-
performing chickens competing for dominance suffers decrements in overall egg production and 
increases in bird mortality, teams with too much talent appear to divert attention away from 
coordination in order to peck at each other in their attempts to establish intragroup standing. In 
many cases, too much talent can be the seed of failure.  
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Endnotes 
 
                                                          
1 We could not conduct these analyses for the 2014 data because the World Cup in Brazil did not 
yet start at the time of writing. 
2
 Although this reliability coefficient is lower than in survey research, it is satisfactory given that 
the three measures included in our coordination index involve objective behavioral measures that 
are aggregated across multiple individuals, teams, months, and seasons (Halevy et al, 2012). 
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